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LESSONS FROM THE CAMBODIAN 
EXPERIENCE WITH TRUTH 
AND RECONCILIATION 
John D. Ciorciari*and Jaya Ranji-Nogales** 
INTRODUCTION 
As South Koreans seek to implement the recommendations of their 
country's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) effectively, Cambo-
dia may not be an immediately intuitive place to look for guidance. Cam-
bodia has never convened a formal truth and reconciliation process or 
produced an extensive official report of human rights violations with spe-
cific policy recommendations. Nevertheless, and starting from the under-
standing that social processes leading to reconciliation are necessarily 
different in different societies, the Cambodian experience does offer some 
important lessons for South Korea and other states working to satisfy the 
rights and needs of victims of past abuses. In particular, the Cambodian 
case may offer a useful example in navigating the complex politics that 
generally characterize transitional justice processes. 
We focus on two central claims about the Cambodian experience. 
First, the Cambodian example highlights the importance of engaging local 
civil society to play a central role in truth and reconciliation initiatives. 
Where, as in Cambodia, political elites prioritize the maintenance and 
growth of their own power, they tend to subordinate certain truths and pur-
sue a shallow form of reconciliation that privileges their narrow interests. 
The needs of ordinary survivors are often sidelined. Though civil society 
has fewer resources and less formal power and authority than the govern-
ment and international institutions in organizing truth and reconciliation ini-
tiatives, it often has the advantage of being more responsive to societal 
interests. It also tends to be less encumbered by the political gridlock gen-
erated by competition among domestic political parties and international 
actors. Local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are particularly well 
positioned to assess and address survivors' needs. 
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In Cambodia, international NGO involvement in truth and reconcilia-
tion initiatives has been limited, both because of local political interference 
and resource constraints. Thus, many of the most active civil society 
groups in the truth and reconciliation arena have been local. These groups 
generally have less funding and transitional justice "expertise" than interna-
tional organizations, but they draw on more relevant cultural resources, so 
may be preferable in the long run. Moreover, the growth of local groups 
addressing reconciliation issues may help to establish a more robust civil 
society that can contribute to deliberative political processes and a more 
stable democratic future. 
Second, Cambodia offers a case study of questions of institutional se-
quencing in transitional justice efforts. In any society, responses to mass 
human rights abuses entail political and societal dialogue about what goals 
to pursue, through what institutional mechanisms, and in what order. We 
discuss how the space for pursuing truth and reconciliation initiatives has 
broadened over time in Cambodia, where official efforts initially focused on 
solidifying peace and only later turned to questions of transitional justice. 
We also examine the ways in which mechanisms that are not aimed 
primarily at promoting truth and reconciliation may create openings in the 
political sphere for truth and reconciliation processes in other forms. In 
Cambodia, a hybrid court established in 2006 by the Cambodian govern-
ment and United Nations has been the central avenue for accountability for 
the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime. Though the tribunal includes inno-
vative measures for victim participation and collective moral reparations, it 
is not an ideal vehicle for truth and reconciliation. The impact of the pro-
ceedings on public knowledge and victims' healing has been modest to 
date, and "donor fatigue" resulting from the costly tribunal makes it un-
likely that funds will be forthcoming for an official TRC in Cambodia. 
Despite these issues, we argue that the existence of this court has 
helped to establish the political space for individual Cambodians and civil 
society organizations to institute important and innovative truth and recon-
ciliation measures. Those non-governmental groups have been the unoffi-
cial implementing agencies of some of the steps that the South Korean TRC 
recommended-such as creating accessible archives, providing human 
rights education, and rewriting official history books. Many of these efforts 
have taken place at grassroots levels, but some have translated into key 
national policy programs. Thus Cambodia offers at least two lessons for 
implementing TRC recommendations: the importance of engaging local 
civil society and seizing the perhaps unexpected benefits that can be derived 
from particular institutional sequences. 
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I. DEFINING TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA 
Implementing measures to advance truth and reconciliation raises dif-
ficult questions within a society, let alone across different societies. What 
aspects of truth should be the focus? What kind of reconciliation is sought, 
and for whom? Both of these concepts are inherently culturally bound, and 
definitions necessarily privilege some normative goals at the expense of 
others. Indeed, to define these terms too precisely belies some of their es-
sence; truth and reconciliation are ideas shaped partly through a complex 
and often contested process of political and social dialogue. 
We begin with the premise that truth and reconciliation mean different 
things to different members of a society at different times.' From that start-
ing point, we present some of the varied ways in which truth and reconcilia-
tion have been defined and pursued in Cambodia in an effort to assess the 
particular needs of ordinary Cambodian survivors. From this case study, 
and again acknowledging the societally and temporally contingent nature of 
the concepts of truth and reconciliation, we can carefully uncover cultural 
and historical parallels that might enable us to draw out lessons for South 
Korea and other countries. 
Truth is, of course, a complex concept. Truth-seeking projects and 
commissions have emphasized multiple forms of truth when they have de-
fined the term at all. 2 Truth is also subject to multiple interpretations within 
Cambodia. 3 To many Cambodians, knowing "the truth" about the Khmer 
Rouge era means, above all, learning the facts surrounding their own pain-
ful experiences and the fate of lost loved ones. To others, truth is primarily 
something for victims to express-a device for empowerment and opportu-
nity to have one's voice heard after more than thirty years of being effec-
tively silenced. Still others yearn to understand why the abuses happened-
to hear explanations directly from the mouths of perpetrators and to under-
stand how the broader system of repression functioned. These differing pri-
1. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke TransitionalJustice: A PluralistPro-
cess Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (2010). 
2. Most legal instruments establishing truth commissions have failed to define 
"truth" precisely. Audrey R. Chapman & Patrick Ball, The Truth of Truth Commis-
sions: ComparativeLessonsfrom Haiti,South Africa, and Guatemala, 23 HUM RTS. Q. 
1,4-12 (2001). The South African TRC was the most explicit, emphasizing four forms 
of truth: factual or forensic truth, personal or narrative truth, social or "dialogue" truth 
that emerges from public interaction and debate, and restorative truth-a concept 
closely linked to acknowledgement. I TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF 
SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 110 (1999). 
3. SUZANNAH LINTON, RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA 126 (2004). 
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orities around truth suggest the need for different transitional justice 
approaches within one or multiple mechanisms. 
Reconciliation also lends itself to numerous definitions that vary and 
even compete along several axes, including goals, subject, and scope. It is 
widely understood as a long-term process, the objectives of which may 
themselves be rich concepts such as truth, justice, and peace.4 Reconcilia-
tion can signify an end of armed conflict or tense political divisions, but it 
can also refer to individuals' need for a degree of personal healing or clo-
sure. The Khmer concept of reconciliation, karphsasphsa, implies both. It 
literally means "reconnecting the broken pieces" and suggests a process of 
healing, both internally and by bringing former enemies back together.5 
Rebuilding a shattered society requires reconciliation at the individual, 
community, and national levels as people mutually acknowledge past suf-
fering and re-establish productive relationships. 
Survey evidence captures the complexity and dynamism of the concept 
of reconciliation as Cambodians come to terms with the past. Analysts 
from the University of California-Berkeley's Human Rights Center sur-
veyed 1,000 Cambodians in late 2008 and conducted a second survey in 
December 2010. In 2008, respondents characterized reconciliation as the 
absence of violence and conflict (56%), unity and living together (33%), 
and communication and mutual understanding (9%).6 In 2010, 54% of re-
spondents focused on unity and living together, 38% on communicating and 
4. Most definitions of reconciliation suggest a process of acknowledging and grap-
pling with the past, coming to understand it, and changing attitudes to make more posi-
tive relationships possible. See, e.g., LINTON, supra note 3, at 106; and Brandon 
Hamber & Grdinne Kelly, Beyond Coexistence: Towards a Working Definition of Rec-
onciliation, in RECONCILIATION(S): TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES 
287-95 (Joanna R. Quinn ed., 2009). South Africa's Archbishop Desmond Tutu has 
described reconciliation as involving "a very long and painful journey, addressing the 
pain and suffering of the victims, understanding the motivations of offenders, bringing 
together estranged communities, trying to find a path to justice, truth and, ultimately, 
peace." Desmond Tutu, Foreword to RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: A 
HANDBOOK 4 (David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes & Luc Huyse eds., 2003). 
5. Ana Garcfa Rodicio, Restorationof Life: A New TheoreticalApproach to Repa-
triation based on a Cambodian Experience of Return, 13 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 126 
(2001); Action Asia, Exploring Asian Approaches to Peace Building - PracticalIn-
sights and Reflections 32 (2007), <http://www.actionasia.org/fileadmin/user-upload/ 
ExploringAsianApproaches toPeacebuilding book l.pdf>. 
6. Phuong Pham et al., Human Rights Ctr., Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, So We Will 
Never Forget: A Population-BasedSurvey on Attitudes about Social Reconstruction 
and the ExtraordinaryChambers in the Courts of Cambodia 28 (Jan. 2009), http:// 
www.law.berkeley.edu/HRCweb/pdfs/So-We-Will-Never-Forget.pdf [hereinafter 2009 
Berkeley Report]. 
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mutual understanding, and only 15% on an absence of violence and con-
flict. 27% also suggested that reconciliation meant having gentleness and 
compassion for one another.7 Reconciliation in Cambodia is a multi-level, 
multi-faceted process. 
Governments, non-state organizations, and ordinary people may pro-
mote the varied goals of reconciliation in a number of ways. While am-
nesty programs might advance the goal of short-term peace, criminal trials 
and civil remedies (such as awards of reparations) might offer a greater 
measure of justice, and truth and reconciliation commissions may present a 
broader picture of the truth. A variety of other measures such as public 
ceremonies, memorials, and individual or community-level counseling can 
supplement efforts to advance these and other goals. Not all of these ap-
proaches work synergistically all of the time, however. As John Paul 
Lederach argues, the process of reconciliation often involves dealing with 
profound paradoxes: trying to build a shared future while seeking truths 
about a divided past and promoting mercy and mutual acceptance while 
insisting on justice and accountability for past offenses.8 The difficulty of 
marrying all aspects of reconciliation simultaneously points to the impor-
tance of timing. Institutions must sometimes be sequenced in a way that 
prioritizes different goals over time, thus meeting the needs of broader seg-
ments of society. 
In Cambodia, reconciliation initiatives to date have focused primarily 
on healing scars from the Khmer Rouge period. That period was the most 
terrifying in the country's history, but it was not the only period of human 
rights abuses. Like the process of deciding what truth bears telling, choos-
ing the reference point for reconciliation entails powerful normative and 
political considerations. 
II. THE WINNOWING OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN 
CAMBODIA, 1979-2006 
Official efforts at truth and reconciliation in Cambodia have been 
deeply intertwined with power politics. In particular, they have been asso-
ciated with the rise of the Vietnam-backed People's Republic of 
7. Phuong Pham et al., Human Rights Ctr., Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, After the First 
Trial: A Population-BasedSurvey on Knowledge and Perception of Justice and the 
ExtraordinaryChambers in the Courts of Cambodia 33 (July 2011) http://www.law. 
berkeley.edu/HRCweb/pdfs/After-the-First-Trial.pdf [hereinafter 2011 Berkeley Re-
port]. Figures do not add up to 100%, because the survey allowed respondents to em-
phasize more than one aspect of reconciliation. 
8. JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN Di-
VIDED SOCIETIES 31 (1997). 
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19 
Kampuchea (PRK), which supplanted Pol Pot in January 1979, and the sub-
sequent reemergence of PRK leaders as the Cambodian People's Party 
(CPP) in the 1990s. The CPP's approach to reconciliation has prioritized 
political consolidation and an end to armed conflict, offering a form of for-
giveness to Khmer Rouge members willing to acquiesce in CPP leadership. 
In terms of institutional sequencing, then, the PRK and CPP prized amnesty 
over accountability. The CPP has also introduced efforts at truth and jus-
tice, but generally in a way calculated to advance its political position. This 
focus on "macro-reconciliation"-maintaining peace and stability at the na-
tional level-was necessary to some degree during the years of armed con-
flict and insurgency that stretched from 1979 into the mid-1990s. However, 
the justification for focusing on macro-reconciliation has weakened over 
time. 
Compromises among rival political groups are rarely enough to foster 
broad revelations of the truth or deep grassroots reconciliation. The focus 
on political stability in Cambodia, in part through formal or informal am-
nesty schemes, has imposed limits on "micro-reconciliation" at the level of 
individuals and communities. 9 Many survivors cite Khmer Rouge impunity 
as a source of continuing anguish and an obstacle to personal healing.1° 
Even more describe their inability to understand the atrocities as a barrier to 
reconciliation." Until very recently, official Cambodian history textbooks 
included just a single line about the Pol Pot regime. Complaints of physical 
and emotional injury are ubiquitous, pointing to another macro-level failure 
with micro-level consequences: the virtual absence of even rudimentary 
counseling and health services. 12 The Cambodian government and key in-
ternational actors could not have been expected to solve all of these chal-
9. See generally John D. Ciorciari, Cambodia's Trek Toward Reconciliation, 23 
PEACE REV. 438 (2011). 
10. In the 2008 Berkeley survey, nearly 40% of respondents said that top Khmer 
Rouge leaders needed to be punished before they could forgive them. 2009 Berkeley 
Report, supra note 6, at 29-30. See also John D. Ciorciari and Sok-Kheang Ly, The 
ECCC's Role in Reconciliation, in ON TRIAL: THE KHMER ROUGE ACCOUNTABILITY 
PROCESS, at 335-39 (John D. Ciorciari & Anne Heindel eds., 2009). 
11. In the 2008 Berkeley survey, 64% of respondents agreed with the statement 
that they could not reconcile without knowing the truth about what happened. Large 
majorities indicated that they wanted to know more about the Khmer Rouge regime, 
and most reported their knowledge of the period as poor or very poor-especially those 
who did not live through it. 2009 Berkeley Report, supra note 6, at 25-27. See also 
Sok-Kheang Ly, Follow-up Survey on NationalReconciliation (2007) (on file with the 
Documentation Center of Cambodia). 
12. For a discussion of Cambodia's challenges in meeting even rudimentary 
mental health care needs, see generally CAMBODIA'S HIDDEN SCARS (Beth Van 
Schaack, Daryn Reicherter & Youk Chhang eds., 2011). 
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lenges. However, Cambodia's experience illustrates how reconciliation 
processes can be unresponsive to individual and community needs when the 
legitimate aim of securing the peace and the significantly less legitimate 
goal of gaining or preserving political power drive institutional design and 
sequencing decisions. Moreover, reconciliation processes designed without 
the regular and active participation of civil society are significantly less 
likely to address these needs. 
A. Early Efforts at Truth and Reconciliation 
Immediately after the toppling of the Pol Pot regime, the new PRK 
government and its Vietnamese allies placed a legitimate priority on quel-
ling the large Khmer Rouge insurgency and pacifying a country where im-
pulses for revenge were strong. The goals of peace and political stability 
drove institutional design decisions, and transitional justice mechanisms 
were created and implemented by the government alone. In the years fol-
lowing the Pol Pot regime, much of the population harbored vindictive feel-
ings against former Khmer Rouge cadres. Revenge killings took place in 
various parts of the country, as survivors took reprisal for the deaths of their 
loved ones and other members of their communities. The PRK faced a 
dilemma. Many of its officials and troops also sought revenge against the 
Khmers Rouges, and demonizing the Pol Potists helped legitimize PRK 
rule. However, violent reprisals against some former Khmer Rouge cadres 
threatened to exacerbate Cambodia's civil war by pushing greater numbers 
of former Khmer Rouge rank and file into the jungles, where they would 
fight alongside Pol Pot's forces instead of defecting to the new government 
or dropping their arms. The PRK thus had an incentive to stop the revenge 
killings, even if it had little sympathy for Khmer Rouge cadres. 
The PRK instituted a kind of reconciliation plan, offering carrots to 
defecting Khmer Rouge soldiers while also wielding a formidable stick.1 3 
The plan entailed using military counter-insurgency measures to coerce 
rebels to "reconcile" while issuing leaflets and radio broadcasts promising 
13. Later in the conflict, hundreds of thousands of Cambodians were recruited or 
compelled to participate in the "K-5" scheme by helping to lay landmines and build a 
wall to separate Khmer Rouge guerillas form the rest of the population. EVAN GorEs-
MAN, AFTER THE KHMER ROUGE: INSIDE THE POLITICS OF NATION-BUILDING 231-37 
(2002). It resulted in thousands of deaths and injuries on both sides of the conflict and 
contributed to lasting resentment in some communities against the PRK (and later the 
CPP). 
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leniency to Khmer Rouge rebels who laid down their arms, apologized, 
underwent reeducation, and rejoined the fold. 
14 
In August 1979, the PRK arranged a transitional justice process: a 
five-day trial of Pol Pot and one of his deputies, Ieng Sary. The "People's 
Revolutionary Tribunal" returned history's first genocide conviction. The 
trial it held was connected closely to the government's defection policy. By 
pinning the blame on Chinese "hegemonists" and a handful of domestic 
villains, the trial presented the rest of society as victims, which the PRK 
hoped would dampen revenge killings and keep frightened former Khmer 
Rouge rank and file from joining the insurgency. 
The strategy succeeded in abating revenge killings and attracting many 
Khmers Rouges to lay down their arms or join the PRK. The tribunal also 
provided some useful information and public recognition of the suffering of 
millions of people under Khmer Rouge rule. However, many survivors 
found the trials inadequate to make them forgive and reconcile with low-
level Khmer Rouge cadres. The trials were also riddled with procedural 
flaws and were rejected outside the country as a way to justify the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Rather than helping the new govern-
ment solidify control, many outside powers-including China, Thailand, 
and the West-supported a coalition of royalists, right-wing republican 
rebels, and Khmers Rouges to fight Vietnam and bleed its Soviet sponsors. 
That "Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea" (CGDK) contin-
ued to occupy Cambodia's seat at the UN General Assembly. 
From 1980 to 1983, the PRK carried out additional measures to sup-
plement criminal trials. The most important of these efforts was the nation-
wide review and condemnation of Khmer Rouge atrocities by the 
government organization Renakse (Salvation Front). The Renakse organ-
ized a series of community meetings in 1983 that had much of the appear-
ance of a truth commission, although they were not labeled as such. The 
committee in charge of the process interviewed survivors around Cambo-
dia, amassed evidence of damage done by the Khmer Rouge to people and 
property, dug up mass graves, examined documents, and wrote a report to 
the government. The Renakse commission also invited victims to sign peti-
tions enumerating Khmer Rouge atrocities in particular parts of the country. 
According to PRK authorities, nearly 9,000 petitions were drafted. 
5 
14. Sok-Kheang Ly, State and Individual Efforts to Bring about Reconciliation 
(Documentation Center of Cambodia, Aug. 2009). 
15. For further discussion of the PRK petitions, see William J. Schulte, THE His-
TORY OF THE RENAKSE PETITIONS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ECCC PROCEEDINGS 
IN SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH (Dec. 2007). Well over 1,000 petitions survive today in 
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Unfortunately, the Renakse truth commission-type process was not 
nearly as effective as it could have been. Like the 1979 trials, it suffered 
from both procedural flaws and over politicization. Most of the Renakse 
petitions were drafted by PRK officials and revealed a nakedly political 
purpose by laying out the PRK's case for prying Cambodia's seat at the UN 
General Assembly away from the CGDK. The government also did little to 
disseminate its findings to the public. Further, the process included no 
Khmer Rouge voices, preventing the occurrence of genuine dialogue be-
tween former foes.' 6 The Renakse process also did little to encourage pub-
lic apologies that could have facilitated healing. Without the involvement 
of civil society, the PRK government furthered its own goals but failed to 
address many of the needs of Cambodian society. 
The PRK government did engage in other, slightly more successful 
efforts to promote reconciliation. The PRK regime erected stupas-Bud-
dhist religious monuments used for worship and remembrance-and other 
memorials at nearly 100 of the most infamous sites of Khmer Rouge terror 
around the country. It also helped ordinary villagers excavate the remains 
of the departed from more than 19,400 mass burial pits across the country-
side. As many Cambodians believed that victims who died violent deaths 
and received improper burials would not be able to be reborn, this official 
assistance was an important recognition of their religious and cultural be-
liefs. In Cambodia, memorials were the first real step towards addressing 
individual and community needs. These relatively small-scale and uncon-
troversial processes may have represented the limits of political viability in 
a highly unstable society. 
The government also developed ceremonies around the memorials, 
though these were often co-opted for partisan political ends. Beginning on 
May 20, 1983, Cambodians began to celebrate a "Day of Anger" to recall 
the abuses of the Khmer Rouge regime and share their pain. Much like the 
1979 trials and Renakse inquiries, the PRK government used the Day of 
Anger to legitimize its rule and mobilize public support for the ongoing 
counterinsurgency campaign. A speech by President of the PRK National 
Assembly Chea Sim on the 1986 Day of Anger reflected this dynamic: 
Beloved comrades and friends... those who died are reminding 
us to be vigilant, to strengthen our solidarity and practice revolution-
the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) archives, containing the signatures 
or thumbprints of 1,166,307 victims. 
16. CRAIG ETCHESON, RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA: THEORY AND PRACTICE 43 
(2004). 
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ary activities. We must be on the alert against the cruelties and poi-
sonous tricks of the enemy...17 
In the context of a continuing guerilla war, the Day of Anger functioned 
more as a rallying cry against the surviving Khmer Rouge movement than 
as a call to lay down arms and reconcile. Even after the dissolution of the 
Khmer Rouge insurgency, Cambodian leaders have too often used the Day 
of Anger to stir vitriol for the sake of partisan advantage, undermining or 
perhaps even eliminating the ceremony's contribution to reconciliation. 
Alongside modest advances in national-level reconciliation, Cambodia 
saw private efforts at micro-reconciliation during the 1980s. Largely relig-
ious in nature, the relative success of these efforts in addressing the needs 
of Cambodians speaks to the importance of involving local non-governmen-
tal actors in reconciliation processes. The most prominent occasion for 
such efforts has been the annual pchum ben festival, a traditional Khmer 
day of remembrance of the dead. According to traditional Khmer Buddhist 
religious beliefs, the gates of hell open once each year, and departed souls 
wander the earth. Cambodians gather at pagodas and place food such as 
rice balls on the earth to ease the spirits' suffering. The ceremony has ad-
ded significance with respect to Khmer Rouge victims, as traditional beliefs 
suggest that spirits are condemned to wander the earth and barred from 
reincarnation until they are acknowledged in a religious ceremony. Pchum 
ben has provided a way for many Cambodians to do so for departed loved 
ones who never received a proper burial.' 
8 
Religious spaces-including Buddhist wats, mosques, and churches-
that had faced relentless attacks under the Pol Pot regime thus became key 
public spaces for personal and community reconciliation. The country's 
beleaguered educational system, which devoted a mere sentence to the 
Khmer Rouge era in history texts, and a virtually non-existent mental health 
system made communities of faith all the more crucial in survivors' quests 
for a sense of healing and inner peace. 
B. UNTAC: PrioritizingPeace 
As the Cold War wound down, Vietnam looked for a way out of Cam-
bodia as its Soviet sponsors turned inward. The major external powers be-
17. Translated by Sour Bunsou and quoted in Rachel Hughes, Memory and Sover-
eignty in Post-1979 Cambodia: Choeung Ek and Local Genocide Memorials in GENO-
CIDE IN CAMBODIA AND RWANDA: NEW PERSPECTIVES 267 (Susan E. Cook ed., 2006). 
18. Ly Daravuth, Notes on Pchum Ben, Brandeis University International Center 
for Ethics, Justice and Public Life, 6-8 <http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/peacebuilding 
arts/pdfs/peacebuildingarts/y%20notes-on-pchumben-2.pdf>; Lor Chandara, Festival 
of the Dead Remembers Torture Victims of KR, CAMBODIA DAILY, Sept. 25, 2000. 
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gan to negotiate a settlement-again, prioritizing peace over justice. To 
most of the key parties, peace meant an end to armed hostilities and putting 
Cambodia on a democratic trajectory. The permanent five members of the 
Security Council and other key states pressed on Cambodia's various fac-
tions, including the Khmer Rouge, to hammer out a peace deal. 
The result, finalized on October 23, 1991, was the Paris Peace Ac-
cords, which established an eighteen-month UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC). The most ambitious peacebuilding initiative in UN 
history, it provided for military peacekeepers, civil administration, and UN-
sponsored elections in 1993. However, it did not focus on truth, reconcilia-
tion and justice, largely because its architects feared such provisions would 
lead Khmer Rouge insurgents to spoil the peace. That fear was reasonable, 
as the Khmers Rouges violated the UN ceasefire on numerous occasions 
and boycotted the elections. There was little political space for accountabil-
ity efforts at that juncture. However, the country did not relapse into war, 
and the 1993 elections helped marginalize Pol Pot's forces politically. UN-
TAC provided neither trials nor amnesty, deferring but not precluding truth-
telling exercises and other forms of transitional justice. 
C. Hun Sen's "NationalReconciliation" Policy 
During the 1990s, Prime Minister Hun Sen used amnesty as part of an 
effort to pursue peace, an approach that served to increase his political 
power but compromised the goal of justice and did nothing to advance 
truth. The 1993 elections resulted in an unstable truce between Hun Sen 
and Norodom Ranariddh, the head of the royalist party Funcinpec, who 
agreed to serve as co-prime ministers in a constitutional monarchy headed 
by Ranariddh's father, King Norodom Sihanouk, who had allied loosely 
with the Khmers Rouges as the political face of the CGDK during the 
1980s. 
As Hun Sen and Ranariddh competed for influence, Hun Sen pursued 
a policy of "national reconciliation" focused on courting Khmer Rouge de-
fectors on terms that would benefit his political party, the CPP. He 
brokered a key 1996 deal with Khmer Rouge leader Ieng Sary, who de-
fected with roughly 3,000 of his fighters-a substantial fraction of the total 
insurgent ranks-in exchange for a royal amnesty and pardon granted by 
King Sihanouk in September of the same year. Those defections almost 
brought the Khmer Rouge armed resistance to a halt. 
In 1997, Hun Sen achieved a decisive upper hand, when he accused 
Ranariddh of a plot to use Khmer Rouge guerillas to seize power, and CPP 
forces defeated royalist partisans in a series of bloody street battles. Hun 
Sen occasionally advocated justice-most notably in a June 1997 letter he 
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co-authored with Ranariddh to the United Nations requesting support to 
establish a tribunal 9-but tended to pit peace against truth and accountabil-
ity. In December 1998, he famously declared that defecting Khmer Rouge 
leaders Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan should be greeted "with bouquets 
of flowers, not with prisons and handcuffs" and that Cambodians should 
"dig a hole and bury the past." 20 The plan failed to produce meaningful 
apologies from Khmer Rouge leaders; Pol Pot's second-in-command, Nuon 
Chea, issued vague regrets for "lives lost" and for "animals that died;" his 
colleague, Khieu Samphan, urged the public to "let bygones be bygones. 
'2 1 
These dismissals of societal suffering did nothing to ease survivors' pain.
2 2 
In early 1999, Cambodian authorities apprehended two more notorious 
Khmer Rouge figures-Duch, who headed the central torture facility at 
Tuol Sleng, and zone commander Ta Mok, also known as "the Butcher." 
The insurgency had essentially crumbled, increasing the practical possibil-
ity of trials or a truth commission. The imperatives of war and peace no 
longer limited the political and societal dialogue to the same extent, and 
more civil society leaders began to press for transitional justice. However, 
along the way, Pol Pot had died, the CPP had signed an amnesty deal with 
Khmer Rouge leader leng Sary, and other former Khmers Rouges occupied 
positions at all levels of government. Hun Sen considered the possibility of 
trials, but emphasized that they should be done "in the context of war and 
peace [and] in the context of national reconciliation, which is all one 
'23 
package. 
19. Identical letters from Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, to the President of 
the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council (Jun. 23 1997), 
(annexed to U.N. Doc. A/51/930, S/1997/488 (Jun. 24, 1997)); Letter from Prince 
Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen, respectively the First and Second Prime Ministers of 
Cambodia, to Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General (Jun. 21, 1997), (annexed to U.N. 
Doc. A/51/930, S/1997/488 (Jun. 24, 1997)). 
20. John Gittings, Pol Pot Men Say Sorryfor Killing Fields,THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 
30, 1998. 
21. Seth Mydans, Under Prodding, 2 Apologize for Cambodian Anguish, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1998. 
22. On Cambodian responses to the defections and subsequent statements of 
Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea, see Wendy Lambourne, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: 
Meeting Human Needs for Justice and Reconciliation, 4 PEACE, CONFLICT & DEV. 1, 
11-12 (2004). 
23. Cambodian Prime Minister seeks reconciliationthrough reconstruction,EIR 
News Service, Feb. 12, 1999 (interviewing Hun Sen). 
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D. Choosing a Tribunal over a Truth Commission 
It was in that context that the United Nations, led by the United States 
and allied Western powers, began to press more assertively for transitional 
justice. Thomas Hammarberg, the UN Secretary-General's human rights 
representative in Cambodia, called for a truth commission. 
24 
In early 1999, a Group of Experts appointed by UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan recommended an international trial of some twenty to thirty 
suspects. Though noting that a truth commission "could not replace prose-
cutions for Cambodia in terms of the goals of justice, closure and accounta-
bility," the UN Group of Experts recommended "a process of reflection 
among Cambodians" to determine the appropriateness and potential design 
of a truth commission for Cambodia. 25 Hun Sen responded by saying he 
preferred a "truth commission" that would swap amnesty deals for Khmer 
Rouge confessions. 
There was little political space available for a truth commission, how-
ever. Some international observers saw it as a way for the Cambodian gov-
ernment to avoid delivering justice. Cambodian political elites and some 
international donors may also have been concerned about a truth commis-
sion's ability to investigate the multitude of unclean hands in Cambodia's 
modern history. There were also concerns that any such process would risk 
reopening old wounds and destabilizing fragile relations between former 
Khmers Rouges and their neighbors. 
In terms of institutional sequencing, then, there was not much choice; 
both the Cambodian government and the United Nations favored a tribunal 
rather than a truth commission. Both invoked the concept of "reconcilia-
tion," but to different political ends. The UN Group of Experts argued that 
justice would facilitate reconciliation, and that an international tribunal, per-
haps in The Hague, would be the most legitimate and effective locus for 
criminal trials. Hun Sen contended that sending Khmer Rouge suspects to a 
foreign court would reignite the insurgency and that the government knew 
best how to keep the peace. The CPP's favored form of stability implied 
further consolidation of domestic political dominance. After several years 
of tense negotiations, the two sides compromised, agreeing to form a "hy-
brid" tribunal within Cambodia's judicial system. 
24. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human 
Rights in Cambodia, Mr. Thomas Hammarberg, submitted in accordance with Commis-
sion resolution 1996/54, Comm. on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/85, §D 
(Jan. 31, 1997). 
25. Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to G.A. 
Res. 52/135, 200, 219, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/135 (Feb. 18, 1999). 
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III. THE KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL, 2006-PRESENT 
The result was the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC), a mixed tribunal combining international and domestic laws, pro-
cedures, and personnel. 26 Both sides favored a relatively narrow judicial 
inquiry focused on surviving "senior leaders" and others deemed "most re-
sponsible" for gross human rights abuses during Pol Pot's reign. The tribu-
nal was thus designed in a manner that would contribute toward a set of 
truths acceptable both to its national and international sponsors. Each side 
believed it would foster a form of reconciliation, but they differed on the 
particulars. International actors and human rights advocates generally 
sought a process that would strengthen the rule of law and by extension 
drive domestic political reforms in Cambodia; the CPP sought a brand of 
reconciliation that would reinforce its domestic political position. 
Most Cambodians surveyed about the tribunal process sought justice, 
but also put a high priority on learning the truth about their personal suffer-
ing and the reasons for the terror of Democratic Kampuchea. Many sought 
explanations from Khmer Rouge leaders, apologies, and an opportunity to 
participate. Unfortunately, the architects of the ECCC did not design the 
tribunal in a way well suited to satisfy those preferences. To a large degree, 
these were left to civil society to fulfill. 
A. Design of the Tribunal 
Courts have inherent limitations as mechanisms for promoting truth 
and reconciliation. They necessarily focus on facts most relevant to deter-
mining the guilt or innocence of the accused. Thus, they can have the unin-
tended-or in some cases intended-consequence of masking structural 
and systemic patterns of injustice that may be at the root of the mass vio-
lence.27 Trials are also complex, and can be difficult for ordinary survivors 
to follow. Advocates contend that they facilitate reconciliation by assigning 
culpability, acknowledging victims' suffering, expunging impunity, and 
26. Cambodia enjoys an edge, appointing a majority of judges and occupying key 
administrative functions, such as the heads of the Public Affairs office and the Victims 
Unit. For a detailed review of the court's judicial and administrative structure, see 
Anne Heindel, Overview of the ExtraordinaryChambers, in ON TRIAL, supra note 10, 
at 85-112; John A. Hall, Court Administration at the ECCC, in ON TRIAL, supra note 
10, at 172-81. 
27. Rama Mani, Reparation as a Component of TransitionalJustice: Pursuing 
"ReparativeJustice" in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict, in OUT OF THE ASHES: REPA-
RATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS AND SYSTEMIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 53, 53, 68 
(K. De Feyter et al. eds. 2005). 
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helping build a stronger rule of law. Those outcomes are all eminently 
desirable, but they do not automatically lead to a broad rendering of the 
truth or to reconciliation. In fact, by reinforcing a victim-perpetrator di-
chotomy, trials may further entrench post-conflict social divisions. 
28 
There are nevertheless important strengths in the ECCC's institutional 
design, proceedings, and setting that give the tribunal the potential to facili-
tate truth-telling and contribute to reconciliation. The ECCC's in-country 
setting facilitates connections with the public that would be impossible for 
trials in The Hague. The ECCC also has mechanisms enabling survivors to 
submit complaints and an innovative scheme whereby victims can join the 
proceedings as civil parties in addition to other forms of participation. Yet 
the tribunal has made slow progress to date, completing just one trial and 
suffering from chronic political and administrative crises. Its provisions for 
victim participation have also had mixed results. 
29 
B. Victim Participation 
Participation in the ECCC's proceedings might have enabled 
Cambodians to speak the truth and have their voices heard. In theory, in-
creasing victims' active involvement in a trial process is more likely to 
result in victim healing. 30 In practice, the forms of survivor participation 
allowed at the ECCC - witness testimony, civil party participation, the sub-
mission of written complaints, and attendance in the viewing hall - have so 
far failed to contribute much to this form of truth. 
The first form of participation is through testimony, which offers the 
opportunity for victims to interact most intensively with the judicial pro-
cess. At times, testifying can have a cathartic effect.31 Yet testifying, at 
least in Case 001, has been insufficiently empowering for participants for a 
few reasons. First, the Trial Chamber has used its rules of conduct to disci-
pline witnesses whose testimony strayed beyond the limited scope of the 
Chamber's evidentiary needs.32 The court's inquiries, which are restricted 
28. Id. at 67. 
29. See generally Toni Holness & Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Participationas Repara-
tions: The ECCC andHealing in Cambodia,in CAMBODIA'S HIDDEN SCARS, supra note 
12, at 172. 
30. Brandon Hamber, The Dilemmas of Reparations: In Search of a Process-
Driven Approach, in OUT OF THE ASHES: REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS AND 
SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 135, 149 (K. De Feyter et al., eds. 2005). 
31. John D. Ciorciari & Anne Heindel, Trauma in the Courtroom,in CAMBODIA'S 
HIDDEN SCARS: TRAUMA PSYCHOLOGY IN THE WAKE OF THE KHMER ROUGE, supra note 
12, at 123-29 (providing some examples from the Duch case, as well as counterexam-
pies suggesting re-traumatization). 
32. Holness & Ramji-Nogales, supra note 29, at 172, 174-75. 
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to admissible evidence, do not always match the interests or needs of vic-
tims. Judges have asked witnesses to restrain themselves emotionally and 
restrict their testimony to only those facts that judges consider useful. Sec-
ond, the ECCC has been inaccessible to many of the witnesses both because 
of the rigidity of its technical rules regarding testimony and its intimidating 
and unfamiliar appearance. 33 Witnesses have become preoccupied with rule 
compliance, hindering the expression of the substance of their testimony. 
Third, some testifying survivors have found the physical structure and tech-
nologies of the ECCC intimidating and emotionally challenging. 34 The im-
posing physical presence of the court building and the sophisticated 
technology upon which the court process relied were often entirely alien to 
witnesses, many of whom scarcely have access to electricity in their home 
villages. 
The ECCC is the first international criminal tribunal to implement a 
second form of victim participation: the civil party process. Through this 
mechanism, victims who allege that they suffered direct abuses as a result 
of a defendant's conduct can participate in the proceedings by filing docu-
ments and presenting arguments before the tribunal. 35 The civil party pro-
cess has been limited or problematic in a variety of ways, and as a result has 
failed adequately to enable Cambodian voices. First, the ECCC Internal 
Rules necessarily preclude most Cambodians from participating as civil 
parties if they cannot establish a link to a particular defendant's crimes. 
Indeed, in the first trial against Duch, the former head of the Khmer Rouge 
torture and interrogation facility at Tuol Sleng, the tribunal dismissed appli-
cations of some for failure to prove a close bond of affection with or depen-
dency on one of Duch's victims. 36 The extent of participation by those 
selected was also limited given legitimate resource and time constraints in 
the court.37 The relatively low number of civil party petitioners suggests a 
33. Id. at 177. 
34. Id. 
35. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules (Rev. 8), 
rev'd Aug. 3, 2011, at 22 [hereinafter ECCC Internal Rules], available at http://www. 
eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/ECCC%20Internal%2ORues%20(Rev. 
8)%2OEnglish.pdf. 
36. Prosecutor v. Guek Eav Kaing alias Duch, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-
ECCC/TC ECCC, Transcript of Trial Proceedings-Kaing Guek Eav "Duch", at 27 
(July 26, 2010) [hereinafter 26 July 2010 transcript], http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/courtdoc/El_83.1_TROOI_20100726_Final ENPub.pdf. 
37. See Sarah Thomas, Civil Party Participationat the ECCC, INTLAwGRRLS 
(July 15, 2008), availableat http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2008/07/civil-party-partici-
pation-at-eccc.html (discussing the reasons for the ECCC's change in attitude, from 
welcoming to exclusionary, toward civil parties). 
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fear of proceedings; it may also reflect a lack of detailed knowledge about 
or interest in the ECCC.
3s 
A third way to participate is through victim complaints, which might 
have presented an opportunity to enable victims to speak the truth and be 
heard. Here the court's main challenge has been capacity. Given the huge 
number of aggrieved victims, the court's understaffed, underfunded Vic-
tims' Unit has had a difficult time even acknowledging complaints in a 
timely manner, which risks undermining petitioners' confidence in the exer-
cise. In 2009, a non-Cambodian with strong ties to the government and 
links to a Marxist organization became head of the Victims' Unit. 39 She 
later stepped down, but to some survivors that appointment diminished the 
unit's legitimacy. Public confidence in the tribunal, and particularly the 
Victims' Unit, is imperative if participation is to be reparative. 
A fourth way to participate is to observe the trial proceedings from the 
gallery or on television. The ECCC Internal Rules authorize judges to limit 
observers' emotional expression during trials, 40 which has hindered the po-
tential reparative effect that might have resulted from a more interactive 
process. Although one of the espoused benefits of an in-country tribunal is 
its proximity to survivors, the facility in Phnom Penh remains inaccessible 
38. The 2008 Berkeley survey found that 85% of respondents reported having no 
or limited knowledge of the ECCC. 2009 Berkeley Report, supra note 6, at 3. The 
2010 survey showed progress: only 38% of respondents described their knowledge of 
the ECCC as limited, while 67% could accurately describe the basic hybrid nature of 
the court. 2011 Berkeley Report, supra note 7, at 3. A 2009 survey by the International 
Republican Institute again showed that general public awareness about the trials had 
risen and that roughly one third of respondents had seen part of the trials on television. 
Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion, INT'L REPUBLICAN INST. 32-39 (July 31 - Aug. 
26, 2009), http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2010%20February%202%20Survey%20 
of%20Cambodian%2OPublic%200pinion,%2OJuly%203 I-August%2026,%202009%20 
-%20Khmer%20and%20English%20version.pdf. 
39. One Khmer Rouge survivor wrote, "[Ilit is both absurd and insulting to have a 
Marxist advocate representing the victims of a Marxist regime, which was being tried 
by the court of law." Chanda Chhay, Open Letter to Dr. Helen Jarvis,Appointed Head 
of the Victims Unitat the ExtraordinaryChamber in the Courtof Cambodia,KI-MEDIA 
(June 20, 2009), http://ki-media.blogspot.com/2009/O6/open-letter-to-dr-helen-jarvis. 
html. See also Patrick Falby, Cambodia KRouge court leaves victims disappointed, 
AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Sept. 13, 2010, availableathttp://lg-media.blogspot.com/2009/09/ 
cambodia-krouge-court-leaves-victims.html. 
40. "Where, in the view of the Chambers, any person is disrupting the proceed-
ings, they shall first issue a warning. In cases of continued disruption, the Chambers 
may order the person disrupting the proceedings to leave or be removed from the court-
room or the premises of the ECCC and, in case of repeated misconduct, may order the 
exclusion of that person from attending the proceedings." ECCC Internal Rules, supra 
note 35, at 35. 
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to most indigent survivors in the countryside, and televised viewing is un-
available in most of the country. 
C. The ECCC's Effects on Reconciliation to Date 
There is some evidence that the ECCC is contributing to reconciliation 
if we define the term as unity, communication, and compassion. 4 1 The 
2010 Berkeley survey found that 80% of respondents believed the ECCC 
would help rebuild trust and promote national reconciliation in Cambodia, 
and roughly 25% expected that the trials would help ease mental anguish 
among individual survivors. 42 Finally, contrary to the expressed fears of the 
Cambodian government that efforts to end impunity would lead to fresh 
violence, the first five years of the ECCC's operations have not prompted 
outbreaks of violence, and upheaval appears unlikely in the near future. The 
passage of time is one reason, but another appears to be broad-based public 
acceptance of the basic legitimacy of the process. 
However, the ECCC is also plagued by severe and ongoing weak-
nesses that limit its potential to bring justice, truth, or reconciliation to vic-
tims of the Pol Pot regime. Public in-fighting between the United Nations 
and Cambodian government has intensified the politicization of the process 
and eroded the tribunal's independent judicial credibility. 43 In particular, a 
feud between the Cambodian government and selected UN staff about 
whether to add additional defendants has caused both delay and despair 
among some survivors, who seek additional prosecutions." A significant 
number of Cambodians remains skeptical of the contribution of the trials to 
reconciliation. They retain deep-seated anger toward both Khmer Rouge 
leaders and the lower-level cadres who inflicted abuse on their families. 
Another crucial limitation of the civil party scheme relates to repara-
tions. Cambodia clearly lacks the financial resources to provide a level of 
financial restoration that would compensate millions of victims fully for the 
41. See infra discussion of Cambodian definitions of reconciliation. Interviews 
with survivors after the Duch trial suggest a modest positive contribution for many 
observers of the process but also residual anger and a suspicion of the sincerity or value 
of apologies by those deemed most responsible for Khmer Rouge atrocities. See Ci-
orciari & Ly, supra note 10, at 334-39. 
42. 2011 Berkeley Report, supra note 7, at 7-10. 
43. See, e.g., Sophal Ear, Editorial, Khmer Rouge Tribunal vs. Karmic Justice, 
INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar. 17, 2010; John Hall, A U.N. Fiascoin Cambodia, WALL 
ST. J. ONLINE, Oct. 5, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702046125 
04576608511111845334.html. 
44. See, e.g., Statement by the InternationalCo-InvestigatingJudge, EXTRAORDI 
NARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/ 
statement-international-co-investigating-judge. 
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personal and economic losses they suffered. In the ECCC, Internal Rule 23 
quinquiesprovides that the court may award only collective and moral repa-
rations to Civil Parties. 45 It adds that such reparations "shall be awarded 
against, and be borne by convicted persons," and may comprise orders to 
publish the judgment in news or other media at the convicted person's ex-
pense; orders to fund a non-profit activity or service that is intended for the 
benefit of victims; or "other appropriate and comparable forms of 
46
reparation." 
The language of Rule 23 does not necessarily limit reparations to a 
convicted person's resources, but it also makes no explicit provision for 
other sources of funding. Duch responded to an inquiry regarding repara-
tions by stating that he does not "have any ability to assist anybody at this 
stage. '47 Other defendants are also apt to have little if anything to contrib-
ute to financial reparations. Any reparative awards will at best be of sym-
bolic significance when measured against the myriad survivors who 
endured the brutal policies of the Pol Pot regime. 
The tribunal has the power to grant collective and moral reparations, 
and non-governmental groups suggested a variety of options, such as health 
clinics and memorials. However, the court lacks the power to require gov-
ernment action to establish such facilities and depends on donor resources 
to carry out its mandate. At the end of the Duch case, it offered victims 
only two meager forms of collective and moral reparation: inclusion of the 
names of civil parties and their relatives who died at S-21 in the judgment, 
and an online compilation of statements of apology made by Duch during 
the trial.
48 
IV. REMAINING CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED 
Cambodia has taken some steps toward truth and reconciliation, but 
the process remains far from complete. Cambodia's experience with truth 
and reconciliation suggests several lessons that can be usefully applied in 
South Korea and other states working to implement recommendations re-
lated to truth-telling, memory preservation, reparative justice, apologies, 
45. See ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 35, at 25. 
46. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules (Rev. 5), 
rev'd Feb. 5, 2010, at 25 [hereinafter ECCC Internal Rules (Rev. 5)], availableat http:/f 
www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/lRv5-EN.pdf. 
47. Prosecutor v. Guek Eav Kaing alias Duch, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-
ECCC/TC ECCC, Transcript of Trial Proceedings - Kaing Guek Eav "Duch", at 114 
(Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/ 
courtdoc/El_63.1_TROO120090817_FinalEN Pub.pdf. 
48. 26 July 2010 transcript, supra note 36, at 28. 
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and reconciliation. The role of civil society has been crucial in implement-
ing each of these goals in Cambodia. While the official transitional justice 
mechanisms to date have been less than effective in achieving these goals, 
the ECCC has created political space that has made progress towards these 
goals possible. 
A. The Role of Justice 
The importance of justice to reconciliation, both in its retributive and 
restorative forms, has been clear in Cambodia. The failure to deal deci-
sively with the problem of impunity has impeded reconciliation for many 
Cambodian survivors. Youk Chhang, the director of the Documentation 
Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), has argued that: "Peace requires more than 
the absence of armies in open combat. A peaceful society is a just society, 
and the Cambodian people have not yet found justice. Peace will not truly 
come to Cambodia until there is real justice for the crimes of the Khmer 
Rouge regime. '49 The ECCC has put a handful of people on trial, but slow 
progress and their advancing ages means they may never be convicted. The 
narrow scope of the court's jurisdiction also leaves many observers perceiv-
ing the tribunal more as political theater than justice. Participants in the 
trials, who have been few in number relative to the millions of victims of 
Khmer Rouge brutality, generally have been unable to contribute to truth-
telling in a form that would be empowering to them. Without genuine apol-
ogies or explanations from the architects of Khmer Rouge terror, many 
have been unable to trust or forgive former Khmer Rouge cadres living in 
their midst. 
Cambodia also shows the difficulty of using judicial processes as a 
means to reparative justice. Khmer Rouge misrule and years of ensuing 
war decimated an already weak economy and left the state with little capac-
ity to provide meaningful reparation to victims even if it had wished to do 
so. South Korea's greater wealth may enable it to offer non-trivial compen-
sation to many victims, but if Cambodian survivors' attitudes are any indi-
cation, money will be far from sufficient to provide meaningful reparation. 
Relatively few Cambodians interviewed about the Khmer Rouge accounta-
bility process seek financial remedies. Many more demand the truth about 
lost relatives and the circumstances of their own suffering. 
49. Youk Chhang, Speech for the Truman-Reagan Freedom Award, Washington, 
DC (Nov. 4,2000), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20081121044203/ http:/! 
www.wccpd.org/news/news70.html. 
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B. Truth through Public Education 
A number of scholars and human rights groups have advocated a truth 
commission in Cambodia.50 A body empowered to investigate and remedy 
past abuses could build upon the limited truth told by the ECCC. Neverthe-
less, a formal truth commission in Cambodia is quite unlikely. Donors have 
already begun to waver on the commitment of additional resources to the 
ECCC, and the government has long been wary of a broad-based TRC pro-
cess. The ECCC can help through effective outreach, but its account of the 
past will be focused on the specific charges against the defendants in 
custody. 
In the absence of a broader TRC process, educational initiatives are 
particularly crucial-as they likely will be in South Korea and other states 
seeking to implement truth-telling recommendations. Cambodians want to 
know more about their country's history. The 2010 Berkeley survey found 
that 67% of Cambodians who lived under the Khmer Rouge and 85% who 
did not, wanted to know more about the Pol Pot era.
51 
In recent years, the Cambodian government has made more extensive 
progress by partnering with DC-Cam and other civil society groups. 52 For 
years, Cambodian textbooks had only a single line devoted to Khmer Rouge 
history. The Cambodian government generally shied away from grassroots 
programs that encourage more robust discussion of Khmer Rouge atrocities 
and contribute to a fuller historical account. This avoidance was in part due 
to the intense emotional sensitivity of the issues and possibility of social 
conflict, and in part due to the fear that a full vetting of the truth would 
expose some unwanted facts about the history of groups or individuals cur-
rently in power. 
Since 2008, DC-Cam and the Ministry of Education have undertaken a 
major nationwide project to reform school curricula, added a course at sec-
ondary school and university levels on Khmer Rouge history, and trained 
teachers and lecturers on pedagogy. With authority from the government, 
50. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji, Reclaiming CambodianHistory: The Casefor a Truth 
Commission, 24 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 137 (2000). 
51. 2011 Berkeley Report, supra note 7, at 32. 
52. DC-Cam is a non-governmental organization dedicated to promoting memory 
and justice with respect to Khmer Rouge atrocities. It was established in 1995 as the 
field office of Yale University's Cambodian Genocide Program. In 1997, DC-Cam 
became an independent Cambodian NGO with funding from diverse states and interna-
tional agencies, and it runs projects related to Khmer Rouge history, public education, 
accountability promotion, community reconciliation, and support for the ECCC. See 
THE DOCUMEN~TATION CENTER OF CAMBODIA, www.dccam.org (last visited Apr. 16, 
2012). 
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DC-Cam has also established an extensive archive of documents on Khmer 
Rouge history available to researchers. Any country pursuing the emerging 
norm of a "right to the truth" should enact a law pertaining to the declassifi-
cation and disclosure of government records related to human rights 
abuses.53 This and other measures can assist civil society to play a central 
role in disseminating truth through public education. 
C. Reconciliation through Community Dialogues 
Though the ECCC has had a mixed record in establishing reconcilia-
tion, it has spurred innovative and effective civil society efforts to engage 
Cambodians at the community level. These structured dialogues have ena-
bled more widespread consumption of the results of the trials as well as 
conversations about the losses suffered at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. 
Perhaps most importantly, they create a space for victims and perpetrators 
to interact, and foster understanding and forgiveness. 
DC-Cam has brought more than fifteen thousand representatives of 
communities throughout Cambodia to learn about the ECCC. At the begin-
ning of these visits, the DC-Cam hosts legal training sessions that explain 
the Court's jurisdiction and procedures and describe the biographies of the 
defendants. After attending hearings at the ECCC, the community repre-
sentatives return to the DC-Cam for a facilitated discussion of their experi-
ence at the Court. They take this experience back to their villages, where 
they discuss and lead group dialogues about the trials (with the support of 
DC-Cam staff and other experts). These community forums include 
Cambodians from neighboring villages that do not have a representative at 
the trials. The public discussion of suffering under the Khmer Rouge brings 
the shared experiences of the villagers into the open and begins the process 
of community-wide healing. 
The community dialogues also play an important role for the surviving 
Khmer Rouge cadres, who continue to be haunted by the fear of revenge. 
53. The right to the truth for victims of human rights violations has been recog-
nized by a number of United Nations bodies, as well as by regional human rights courts 
and numerous national governments though the establishment of specific archives or 
through general freedom of information laws. See, e.g., Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.T. (ser. C) No. 151 (Sept. 
19, 2006); International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177 (2006) (entered into force 
Dec. 23, 2010); Right to the Truth, Human Rights Council Res. 9/11, UN Doc. A/HRC/ 
Res/9/1 1(2008); Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human 
Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, UN Comm. for Human Rights, UN Doc. E/ 
CN.4/2005/102/ADD.l (Feb. 8, 2005). 
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Many former lower-level cadre live in perpetual worry that the victims who 
live in their villages will engage in violent retribution against them. Former 
Khmer Rouge cadres are grateful for the opportunity that the dialogues pro-
vide to foster understanding among community members and opportunities 
for forgiveness. These community forums also help to dispel any fears or 
misunderstandings that former cadre may have about the possibility of be-
ing prosecuted by the ECCC. 
Perhaps most importantly, the community dialogues empower 
Cambodians themselves to structure a healing process that is most appropri-
ate to address their unique needs. This community input is valuable not 
only in ensuring the legitimacy of the forum and the engagement of villag-
ers, but also in creating a lasting impact on communities. Officials and civil 
society leaders seeking to build a reconciliation process should consider 
how they can ensure that it is not only participant-designed and driven, but 
also inclusive of all societal groups, including perpetrators. Moreover, even 
if primary accountability efforts do not meet community needs, the political 
space they create can be leveraged in the service of processes that are more 
responsive to local concerns. 
D. Public Memorials and Ceremonies 
Cambodian experience also points to the value of neutral, non-political 
public memorials and ceremonies, such as a monument to the departed and 
a national day of remembrance. In Cambodia, ceremonies and memorials 
have been more conducive to healing when they have focused on sharing 
communal suffering and honoring loved ones rather than focusing enmity 
on perpetrators and their kin. They have also been most effective when 
they have tapped into local cultural and religious norms associated with 
healing. In Cambodia, that has often meant appealing to Buddhist princi-
ples of tolerance and forgiveness, but other faiths have proven equally cen-
tral to reconciliation efforts elsewhere. A strong role for local community 
and religious organizations is crucial. Such ceremonies and events must be 
above the fray of partisan politics if they are to encourage reconciliation 
rather than sowing renewed divisions. In practice, that means advocates of 
such initiatives need to exercise considerable discretion and restraint. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A few broad lessons emerge from the Cambodian case. We start from 
the premise that measures in pursuit of truth and reconciliation need to be 
designed and sequenced in the context of local culture and political condi-
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tions to be effective.5 4 The implementation of truth and reconciliation ini-
tiatives must be driven by the preferences of those who need to be 
reconciled. Studies like those undertaken by the UC-Berkeley Human 
Rights Center deserve replication elsewhere-inviting views of survivors 
on what would best help them heal.5 5 This is especially true in societies in 
which political gridlock slows progress at the official level and draws initia-
tives into partisan debates. However, even where power politics drives in-
stitutional sequencing, these politicized processes may help to create 
political space for bottom-up, grassroots truth and reconciliation efforts. 
Civil society groups can and should play a central role in such recon-
ciliation initiatives. Such groups will be best able to build neutral, non-
political forums for truth telling involving genuine dialogue between survi-
vors and perpetrators.5 6 Dialogue can humanize complex historical con-
flicts and enable former adversaries to engage positively with one another. 
Moreover, in order to create a more comprehensive and accurate historical 
picture and help answer the question of "why?," the process needs to allow 
safe space for both victims and perpetrators to share their experiences. The 
engagement of civic and religious leaders can help to ensure that these dia-
logues are tailored to local sensibilities and therefore more effective as rec-
onciliation processes.
5 7 
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